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We study the importance of financial markets for (un)employment fluctuations in a model with searching
and matching frictions where firms issue debt under limited enforcement. Higher debt allows employers
to bargain lower wages which in turn increases the incentive to create jobs. The transmission mechanism
of 'credit shocks' is fundamentally different from the typical credit channel and the model can explain
why firms cut hiring after a credit contraction even if they have not shortage of funds for hiring workers.
The theoretical predictions are consistent with the estimation of a structural VAR whose identifying
restrictions are derived from the theoretical model.
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The recent nancial turmoil has been associated with a severe increase in
unemployment. In the United States the number of unemployed workers
jumped from 5.5 percent of the labor force to about 10 percent and continues
to stay close 9 percent despite more than three years have passed since the
beginning of the recession. Because the nancial sector has been at the center
stage of the recent crisis and the volume of credit has dropped signicantly,
it may be possible that the contraction of credit is an important driving force
of the unemployment hike. According to this view, employers are forced to
cut investment and employment because they have diculties raising funds.
This is the typical `credit channel' described in Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Although there is some compelling evidence that the credit channel has
played an important role at the beginning of the crisis when the volume of
credit contracted sharply and the liquidity dried up, this channel appears
less important for explaining the sluggish recovery of the labor market after
the initial drop in employment. As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, the
liquidity held by US businesses contracted in the rst stage of the crisis,
consistent with the view of a credit crunch. However, after the initial drop,
the liquidity of nonnancial businesses quickly rebounded and shortly after
the crisis rms have completely rebuilt their liquidity. Therefore, in spite
of the credit contraction (see bottom panel of Figure 1) rms seem to have
enough resources to nance investment and hiring.
The fact that rms have rebuilt their liquidity poses some doubts that
the standard credit channel is the primary explanation for the sluggish re-
covery of the labor market after the initial stage of the crisis. Should we then
conclude that the credit contraction is irrelevant for the sluggish recovery of
employment? In this paper we argue that, even if rms have enough funds to
sustain their hiring plans, a credit contraction can still generate a cut in em-
ployment that is very persistent. This is not because lower debt impairs the
hiring ability of rms but because, keeping anything else constant, it places
workers in a more favorable bargaining position allowing them to negotiate
higher wages. Therefore, the availability of credit aects the `willingness',
not (necessarily) the `ability' to hire.
To illustrate the mechanism we use a theoretical framework that shares
the basic ingredients of the models studied in Pissarides (1987) and Mortensen
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Figure 1: Liquidity and debt in the US nonnancial business sector. Liquidity
is the sum of foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, time and
savings deposits. Debt is dened as credit markets instruments. Data is
from the Flows of Funds Accounts.
2ing of job vacancies and workers. We extend the basic structure of these
models in two directions. First, we allow rms to issue debt under limited
enforcement. Second, we introduce an additional source of business cycle

uctuations which aects directly the enforcement constraint of borrowers
and the availability of credit.
Because of the matching frictions and the wage determination process
based on bargaining, rms prefer to issue debt even if there is no xed or
working capital that needs to be nanced. The preference for debt derives
exclusively from the wage determination process, that is, bargaining, whose
empirical relevance is shown in Hall and Krueger (2010). When wages are de-
termined through bargaining, higher debt reduces the net bargaining surplus
which in turn reduces the wages paid to workers. This creates an incentive
for the employer to borrow until the borrowing limit binds. The goal is to
study how exogenous or endogenous changes in this limit aect the dynamics
of the labor market.
Central to our mechanism is the rm's capital structure as a bargain-
ing tool in the wage determination process. Both anecdotal and statistical
evidence point to this channel. Consider the anecdotal evidence rst. An
illustrative example is provided by the case of the New York Metro Transit
Authority. In 2004 the company realized an unexpected 1 billion dollars sur-
plus, largely from a real estate boom. The Union, however, claimed rights
to the surplus demanding a 24 percent pay raise over three years.1 Another
example comes from Delta Airlines. The company weathered the 9/11 airline
crisis but its excess of liquidity allegedly reduced the need to cut costs. This
hurt the rm's bargaining position with workers and three years after 9/11
it faced severe nancial challenges.2
1From The New York Times, Transit Strike Deadline: How extra Money Complicates
Transit Pay Negotiations, 12/15/2005: \The unexpected windfall was supposed to be a
boom[..] but has instead become a liability.[..] How, union leaders have asked, can the
authority boast of such a surplus and not oer raises of more than 3 percent a year? Why
aren't wages going up more?". In a similar vein: \The magnitude of the surplus [..] has
set this year's negotiations apart from prior ones, said John E. Zuccotti, a former rst
deputy mayor. It's a much weaker position than the position the M.T.A. is normally in:
We're broke and we haven't gotten any money [..]. The playing eld is somewhat dierent.
They haven't got that defense".
2From The Wall Street Journal, Cross Winds: How Delta's Cash Cushion Pushed
It Onto Wrong Course, 10/29/2004: \In hindsight, it is clear now that Delta's pile of
cash and position as the strongest carrier after 9/11 lured the company's pilots and top
managers onto a dire course. Delta's focus on boosting liquidity turned out to be its
3The idea that debt allows employers to improve their bargaining position
is supported by several empirical studies in corporate nance. Bronars and
Deere (1991) document a positive correlation between leverage and labor
bargaining power, proxied by the degree of unionization. Matsa (2010) nds
that rms with greater exposure to (union) bargaining power have a capital
structure more skewed towards debt. Atanassov and Kim (2009) nd that
strong union laws are less eective in preventing large-scale layos when rms
have higher nancial leverage. Gorton and Schmid (2004) study the impact
of German co-determination laws on rms' labor decisions and nd that rms
that are subject to these laws exhibit greater leverage ratios. Chen, Chen
and Liao (2011) show that labor union strength relates positively to bond
yield spreads.
All the aforementioned studies suggest that rms may use nancial lever-
age strategically in order to contrast the bargaining power of workers. Al-
though there are theoretical studies in the micro-corporate literature that
investigates this mechanism (see Perotti and Spier (1993)), the implications
for employment dynamics at the macroeconomic level have not been fully
explored. The goal of this paper is to explore these implications. In par-
ticular, we study the response of the labor market to a shock that aects
directly the availability of credit for employers. These shocks resemble the
`credit shocks' studied in Jermann and Quadrini (2009) but the transmission
mechanism is fundamentally dierent. While in Jermann and Quadrini these
shocks are transmitted through the standard credit channel (higher cost of
nancing employment), in our paper the nancing cost does not change over
time. Instead, the reduction in borrowing places rms in a less favorable
bargaining position with workers and, as a result, they create fewer jobs.
Credit shocks can generate sizable employment 
uctuations in our model.
Furthermore, as long as the credit contraction is persistent|a robust feature
of the data|the impact on the labor market is long-lasting. In this vein, the
properties of the model are consistent with recent ndings that recessions
associated with nancial crisis are more persistent than recessions associated
with systemic nancial diculties. See IMF (2009), Claessens, Kose, and
Terrones (2008), Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Models with the standard
credit channel such as Jermann and Quadrini (2009) can generate severe
drops in employment in response to a credit contraction but cannot easily
greatest blessing and curse, helping the company survive 9/11 relatively unscathed but
also putting o badly needed overhauls to cut costs".
4generate the persistence.
There are other papers in the macro-labor literature that have embedded
credit market frictions in search and matching models. Chugh (2009) and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2009) are two recent contributions. However, the trans-
mission mechanism proposed by these papers is still based on the typical
credit channel. More specically, since rms could be nancially constrained,
the cost of nancing new vacancies plays a central role in the transmission
of shocks. Also related is Wasmer and Weil (2004). They consider an envi-
ronment in which bargaining is not between workers and rms but between
entrepreneurs and nanciers. In this model nanciers are needed to nance
the cost of posting a vacancy and the higher surplus extracted by nanciers
is similar to a higher cost of nancing investments. Thus, the central mech-
anism is still of the credit channel type.3
In order to assess the empirical relevance of credit shocks for employed

uctuations, we estimate a structural VAR with both productivity and credit
shocks. The two shocks are identied using short-term restrictions derived
from the theoretical model. We nd that the response of employment (and
unemployment) to credit shocks is statistically signicant and economically
sizable. Although the VAR analysis does not allow us to separate the stan-
dard credit channel from the channel emphasized in this paper, the empirical
results are consistent with the predictions of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 3 provides analytical intuitions for the response of the econ-
omy to shocks and Section 4 conducts a quantitative analysis. Section 5
extends the baseline model in ways that improve the dynamics of wages.
Section 6 conducts the empirical analysis based on a structural VAR and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
There is a continuum of agents of total mass 1 with lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 tct.
At any point in time agents can be employed or unemployed. They save in
two types of assets: shares of rms and bonds. Risk neutrality implies that
the expected return from both assets is equal to 1=  1. Therefore, the net
interest rate is constant and equal to r = 1=   1.
3Wasmer and Weil (2004) also discuss the possibility of extending the model with wage
bargaining. However, the analysis with wage bargaining is not fully pursued in the paper.
5Firms: Firms are created through the matching of a posted vacancy and a
worker. Starting in the next period, a new rm produces output zt until the
match is separated. Separation arises with probability . An unemployed
worker cannot be self-employed but needs to search (costlessly) for a job.
The number of matches is determined by the function m(vt;ut), where vt
is the number of vacancies posted during the period and ut is the number
of unemployed workers. The probability that a vacancy is lled is qt =
m(vt;ut)=vt and the probability that an unemployed worker nds a job is
pt = m(vt;ut)=ut.
At any point in time rms are characterized by three states: a produc-
tivity zt, an indicator of the nancial conditions t that will be described
below, and a stock of debt bt. The productivity zt and the nancial state t
are exogenous stochastic variables, common to all rms (aggregate shocks).
The stock of debt bt is chosen endogenously. Although rms could choose
dierent levels of debt, in equilibrium they all choose the same bt.
The dividend paid to the owners of the rm (shareholders) is dened by
the budget constraint




where R is the gross interest rate charged on the debt. As we will see, R is
dierent from 1 + r because of the possibility of default when the match is
separated.
Timing: If a vacancy is lled, a new rm is created. The new rm starts
producing in the next period, and therefore, there is no wage bargaining
in the current period. However, before entering the next period, the newly
created rm chooses the debt bt+1 and pays the dividend dt = bt+1=Rt (the
initial debt bt is zero). There is not separation until the next period. Once
the new rm enters the next period, it becomes an incumbent rm.
An incumbent rm starts with a stock of debt bt inherited from the previ-
ous period. In addition, it knows the current productivity zt and the nancial
variable t. Given the states, the rm bargains the wage wt with the worker
and output zt is produced. The choice of the new debt bt+1 and the payment
of dividends arise after wage bargaining. After the payments of dividends
and wages and after contracting the new debt, the rm observes whether
the match is separated. It is at this point that the rm chooses whether to
default. Therefore, each period can be divided in three sequential steps: (i)
6wage bargaining, (ii) nancial decision, (iii) default. These sequential steps
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Figure 2: Timing for an incumbent rm
Remarks on timing: We would like to clarify the importance of the timing
assumptions. Although this will become clear later, it will be helpful to
stress the relevance of our assumptions here. First, the sequential timing
of decisions for an incumbent rm is irrelevant for the dynamic properties
of equilibrium employment. For example, the alternative assumption that
incumbent rms choose the new debt before or jointly with the bargaining of
wages will not aect the dynamics of employment. For new rms, instead,
the assumption that the debt is chosen in the current period while wage
bargaining does not take place until the next period is crucial for the results.
As an alternative, we could assume that bargaining takes place in the same
period in which a vacancy is lled as long as the choice of debt is made
before going to the bargaining table with the new worker. For presentation
purposes, we assumed that the debt is raised after matching with a worker
(but before bargaining the wage). Alternatively, we could assume that the
debt is raised before posting a vacancy but this would not aect the results.
What is crucial is that the debt of a new rm is raised before bargaining for
the rst time with the new worker.
The second point we would like to stress is that the assumption that wages
are bargained in every period is not important. We adopted this assumption
7in order to stay as close as possible to the standard matching model (Pis-
sarides (1987)). In Section 5 we show that the employment dynamics do not
change if we make dierent assumptions about the frequency of bargaining.
All we need is that there is bargaining when a new worker is hired.
Financial contract and borrowing limit: We assume that lending is
done by competitive intermediaries who pool a large number of loans. We
refer to these intermediaries as lenders. The amount of borrowing is con-
strained by limited enforcement. After the payments of dividends and wages,
and after contracting the new debt, the rm observes whether the match is
separated. It is at this point that the rm chooses whether to default. In
the event of default the lender will be able to recover only a fraction t of
the rm's value.
Denote by Jt(bt) the equity value of the rm at the beginning of the
period, which is equal to the discounted expected value of dividends for
shareholders. This function depends on the individual stock of debt bt. Ob-
viously, higher is the debt and lower is the equity value. It also depends
on the aggregate states st = (zt;t;Bt;Nt), where zt and t are exogenous
aggregate states (shocks), Bt is the aggregate stock of debt and Nt = 1   ut
is employment. We distinguish aggregate debt from individual debt since, to
derive the equilibrium, we have to allow for individual deviations. We use
the time subscript t to capture the dependence of the value function from the
aggregate states, that is, we write Jt(bt) instead of J(zt;t;Bt;Nt;bt). We
will use this convention throughout the paper.
We begin by considering the possibility of default when the match is
separated. In this case the value of the rm is zero. The lender anticipates
that the recovery value is zero in the event of separation and the debt will not
be repaid. Therefore, in order to break-even, the lender imposes a borrowing
limit insuring that the rm does not default when the match is not separated
and charges an interest rate premium to cover the losses realized when the
match is separated.
If the match is not separated, the value of the rm's equity is EtJt+1(bt+1),
that is, the next period expected value of equity discounted to the current
period. Adding the present value of debt, bt+1=(1 + r), we obtain the total
value of the rm. If the rm defaults, the lender recovers only a fraction t
of the total value of the rm. Therefore, the lender is willing to lend as long











The variable t is stochastic and aects the borrowing capacity of the rm.
Henceforth, we will refer to unexpected changes in t as `credit shocks'.
By collecting the term bt+1=(1 + r) and using the fact that (1 + r) = 1,
we can rewrite the enforcement constraint more compactly as
tEtJt+1(bt+1)  bt+1; (1)
where t  t=(1   t). We can then think of credit shocks as unexpected
innovations to the variable t. This is the exogenous state variable included
in the set of aggregate states st.
We now have all the elements to determine the actual interest rate that
lenders charge to rms. Since the loan is made before knowing whether
the match is separated, the interest rate charged by the lender takes into
account that the repayment arises only with probability 1   . Assuming
that nancial markets are competitive, the zero-prot condition requires that
the gross interest rate R satises
R(1   ) = 1 + r: (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the lender's expected income per unit of debt.
The right-hand side is the lender's opportunity cost of funds (per unit of
debt). Therefore, the rm receives bt+1=R at time t and, if the match is not
separated, it repays bt+1 at time t+1. Because of risk neutrality, the interest
rate is always constant, and therefore, r and R bear no time subscript.
Firm's value: Central to the characterization of the properties of the
model is the wage determination process which is based on bargaining. Be-
fore describing the bargaining problem, we dene the value of the rm re-
cursively taking as given the wage bargaining outcome. This is denote by
wt = gt(bt). The recursive structure of the problem implies that the wage is
fully determined by the states at the beginning of the period.




zt   gt(bt)   bt +
bt+1
R





Notice that the only choice variable in this problem is the debt bt+1. Also
notice that the rm takes the current wage as given but it fully internalizes
that the choice of debt bt+1 aects future wages. This is captured implicitly
by the next period value Jt+1(bt+1).
Because of the additive structure of the objective function, the optimal
choice of bt+1 does not depend neither on the current wage wt = gt(bt) nor
on the current liabilities bt.
Lemma 1 The new debt bt+1 chosen by the rm depends neither on the
current wage wt = gt(bt) nor on the current debt bt.
Proof 1 Since wt and bt enter the objective function additively and they do
not aect neither the next period value of the rm's equity nor the enforce-
ment constraint, the choice of bt+1 is independent of wt and bt
As we will see, this property greatly simplies the wage bargaining prob-
lem we will describe below.
Worker's values: In order to set up the bargaining problem, we dene the
worker's values ignoring the capital incomes earned from the ownership of
bonds and rms (interests and dividends). Since agents are risk neutral and
the change in the dividend of an individual rm is negligible for an individual
worker, we can ignore these incomes in the derivation of wages.
When employed, the worker's value is
Wt(bt) = gt(bt) + Et

(1   )Wt+1(bt+1) + Ut+1

; (4)
10which is dened once we know the wage function wt = gt(bt). The function
Ut+1 is the value of being unemployed and is dened recursively as
Ut = a + Et

ptWt+1(Bt+1) + (1   pt)Ut+1

;
where pt is the probability that an unemployed worker nds a job and a is
the 
ow utility for an unemployed worker.
While the value of an employed worker depends on the aggregate states
and the individual debt bt, the value of being unemployed depends only on the
aggregate states since all rms choose the same level of debt in equilibrium.
Thus, if an unemployed worker nds a job in the next period, the value of
being employed is Wt+1(Bt+1).
Bargaining problem: Let's rst dene the following functions
^ Jt(bt;wt) = max
bt+1

zt   wt   bt +
bt+1
R
+ (1   )EtJt+1(bt+1)

(5)
c Wt(bt;wt) = wt + Et

(1   )Wt+1(bt+1) + Ut+1

: (6)
These are the values of a rm and an employed worker, respectively, given
an arbitrary wage wt paid in the current period and future wages determined
by the function gt+1(bt+1). The functions Jt(bt) and Wt(bt) were dened in
(3) and (4) for a particular wage equation gt(bt).
Given the relative bargaining power of workers  2 (0;1), the current






c Wt(bt;wt)   Ut
i
: (7)
Let wt =  t(g;bt) be the solution, which makes explicit the dependence on
the function g determining future wages. The rational expectation solution to
the bargaining problem is the xed-point to the functional equation gt(bt) =
 t(g;bt).
We can now see the importance of Lemma 1. Since the optimal debt
chosen by the rm after the wage bargaining does not depend on the wage,
in solving the optimization problem (7) we do not have to consider how the
11choice of wt aects bt+1. Therefore, we can derive the rst order condition
taking bt+1 as given. After some re-arrangement this can be written as
Jt(bt) = (1   )St(bt); (8)
Wt(bt)   Ut = St(bt); (9)
where St(bt) = Jt(bt) + Wt(bt)   Ut is the bargaining surplus. As it is typi-
cal in search models with Nash bargaining, the surplus is split between the
contractual parties proportionally to their relative bargaining power.
Choice of debt: Let's rst rewrite the bargaining surplus as




Notice that the next period surplus enters twice but with dierent state
variables. In the rst term the state variable is the individual debt bt+1 while
in the second is the aggregate debt Bt+1. The reason is because the value of
being unemployed today depends on the value of being employed in the next
period in a rm with the aggregate value of debt Bt+1. Instead, the value
of being employed today also depends on the value of being employed next
period in the same rm. Since the current employer is allowed to choose a
level of debt that diers from the debt chosen by other rms, the individual
state next period, bt+1, could be dierent from Bt+1. In equilibrium, of
course, bt+1 = Bt+1. However, to derive the optimal policy we have to allow
the rm to deviate from the aggregate policy.
Because the choice of bt+1 does not depend on the existing debt bt (see








zt   gt(bt)   bt +
bt+1
R




(1   )tEtSt+1(bt+1)  bt+1;
12where we used Wt+1(bt+1)   Ut+1 = St+1(bt+1) from (8) and the surplus is
dened in (10).
Denoting by t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement
constraint, the rst order condition is
  
h
1 + (1   )t
i
t = 0: (13)
In deriving this expression we used (11) and R(1   ) = (1 + r) = 1. We
can then establish the following result.
Lemma 2 .The enforcement constraint is binding (t > 0) if  2 (0;1):
Proof 2 It follows directly from the rst order condition (13)
A key implication of Lemma 2 is that, provided that workers have some
bargaining power, the rm always chooses to maximum debt and the borrow-
ing limit binds. To gather some intuition about the economic interpretation






















The multiplier results from the product of two terms. The rst term is the
change in next period liabilities bt+1 allowed by a marginal relaxation of the
enforcement constraint, that is, bt+1 = t(1   )EtS(zt+1;Bt+1;bt+1) +  a,
where  a = 0 is a constant. This is obtained by marginally changing  a. In
fact, using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
@bt+1
@ a = 1
1+(1 )t, which
is the rst term.
The second term is the net gain, actualized, from increasing the next
period liabilities bt+1 by one unit (marginal change). If the rm increases
bt+1 by one unit, it receives 1=R units of consumption today, which can be
paid as dividends. This unit has to be repaid next period. However, the
eective cost for the rm is lower than 1 since the higher debt allows the
rm to reduce the next period wage by , that is, the part of the surplus
going to the worker. Thus, the eective repayment incurred by the rm is
1   . This cost is discounted by R = (1 + r)=(1   ) because the debt is
13repaid only if the matched is not separated, which happens with probability
1   . Therefore, the multiplier t is equal to the total change in debt (rst
term) multiplied by the gain from a marginal increase in borrowing (second
term).
2.1 Firm entry and general equilibrium
So far we have dened the problem solved by incumbent rms. We now
consider more explicitly the problem solved by new rms. In this setup
new rms are created when a posted vacancy is lled by a searching worker.
Because of the matching frictions, a posted vacancy will be lled only with
probability qt = m(vt;ut)=vt. Since posting a vacancy requires a xed cost
, vacancies will be posted only if the value is not smaller than the cost.
We start with the denition of the value of a lled vacancy. When a
vacancy is lled, the newly created rm starts producing and pays wages
in the next period. The only decision made in the current period is the
debt bt+1. The funds raised by borrowing are distributed to shareholders.










t(1   )EtSt+1(bt+1)  bt+1:
Since the new rm becomes an incumbent starting in the next period,
St+1(bt+1) is the surplus of an incumbent rm dened in (10).
As far as the choice of bt+1 is concerned, a new rm faces a similar problem
as incumbent rms (see problem (12)). Even if the new rm has no initial
debt and it does not pay wages, it will choose the same stock of debt bt+1 as
incumbent rms. This is because the new rm faces the same enforcement
constraint and the choice of bt+1 is not aected by bt and wt as established
in Lemma 1. This allows us to work with a `representative' rm.
We are now ready to dene the value of posting a vacancy. This is equal
to Vt = qtQt . As long as the value of a vacancy is positive, more vacancies
will be posted. Thus, in equilibrium we must have Vt = 0 and the free entry
14condition can be written as
qtQt = : (15)
In a general equilibrium all rms choose the same level of debt. There-
fore, bt = Bt. Furthermore, assuming that the bargaining power of workers
is positive, rms always borrow up to the limit, that is, Bt+1 = t(1  
)EtSt+1(Bt+1). Using the free entry condition (15) Appendix A derives the
wage equation
wt = (1   )a + (zt   bt) +
[pt + (1   )t]
qt(1 + t)
: (16)
The wage equation makes clear that the initial debt bt acts like a reduction
in output in the determination of wages. Instead of getting a fraction  of
the output, the worker gets a fraction  of the output `net' of debt. Thus,
for a given bargaining power , the larger is the debt and the lower is the
wage received by the worker.
3 Employment response to shocks
In this section we investigate how the value of a lled vacancy Qt is aected
by a credit shock (change in t) and by a productivity shock (change in zt).
Through the free entry condition, qtQt = , we can then infer the impact on
job creation. More specically, if the value of a lled vacancy Qt increases,
the probability of lling a vacancy qt = m(vt;ut)=vt must decline. Since the
number of searching workers ut is given in the current period, this requires
an increase in the number of posted vacancies. Thus, more jobs are created.
Because of the general equilibrium eects of a shock, it is not possible
to derive closed form solutions for the impulse responses. However, we can
derive closed form solutions if we assume that the shock aects only a single
(atomistic) rm. In this way we can abstract from general equilibrium eects
and provide simple analytical intuitions. This is the approach we take in this
section. The full general equilibrium responses will be shown numerically in
the next section.
3.1 Credit shocks
Starting from a steady state equilibrium, suppose that there is one rm with
a newly lled vacancy for which the value of t increases. The increase is
15purely temporary and it reverts back to the steady state value starting in
the next period. We stress that the change involves only one rm so that we
can ignore the general equilibrium consequences of the change.














Applying the implicit function theorem to the enforcement constraint















1 + (1   )t
; (17)
where we have used  = 1=(1 + r).
Proposition 1 Consider a positive credit shock for a newly created rm. If
 2 (0;1), the rise in t increases the value of the rm Qt.
Proof 3 It follows directly from (17) since t and EtSt+1(bt+1) are positive
Therefore, an increase in t raises the value of a newly lled vacancy Qt,
provided that the worker has some bargaining power. The intuition for the
above proposition is straightforward. If the new rm can increase its debt in
the current period, the rm can pay more dividends now and less dividends
in the future. However, the reduction in future dividends needed to repay
the debt is smaller than the increase in the current dividends because the
higher debt allows the rm to reduce the next period wages. Eectively, part
of the debt will be repaid by the worker, increasing the rm's value today.
In deriving this result we assumed that the change in t was only for
one rm so that we could ignore the general equilibrium eects induced by
this change. However, since t is an aggregate variable, this change increases
the value of a vacancy for all rms and more vacancies will be posted. The
higher job creation will have some general equilibrium eects that cannot
be characterized analytically. The full general equilibrium response will be
shown numerically.
163.2 Productivity shocks
Although the main focus of the paper is on credit shocks, we also investigate
how the ability to borrow aects the propagation of productivity shocks since
most of the literature has focused on these shocks.
In general, productivity shocks generate an employment expansion be-
cause the value of a lled vacancy increases. This would arise even if the
level of debt is constant, which is the case in the standard matching model.
In the case in which the constant debt is zero we revert exactly to the stan-
dard matching model. However, if the debt is not constrained to be constant
but changes endogenously, then the impact of productivity shocks on em-
ployment could be amplied.
As for the case of credit shocks, we consider a productivity shock that
aects only one newly created rm. We can thus abstract from general equi-
librium eects. We further assume that the productivity shock is persistent.
The persistence implies that the new rm will be more productive in the next
period when it starts producing. If the increase in zt is purely temporary,
the change will not have any eect on the value of a new match.
The derivative of Qt with respect to zt is
@Qt
@zt














Applying the implicit function theorem to the enforcement constraint











Since @EtSt+1(bt+1)=@bt+1 =  1 (see equation (11)), substituting in the
derivative of the rm's value Qt and using  = 1=(1 + r) we obtain
@Qt
@zt








1 + (1   )t
!
: (18)
We can now compare this expression to the equivalent expression we
would obtain if the borrowing constraint was exogenous. More specically,
we replace the enforcement constraint (1) with the borrowing limit bt+1   b








Comparing (18) to (19), we can see that when the borrowing limit is
endogenous, there is an extra term in the derivative of Qt with respect to
zt. This term is positive if  > 0. Therefore, the change in the value of a
lled vacancy in response to a productivity improvement is bigger when the
borrowing limit is endogenous. Intuitively, the increase in productivity raises
the value of the rm. This allows for more debt which in turn increases the
value of a lled vacancy Qt.
Of course, this does not tell us whether the amplication eect is large
or small. However, we can derive some intuition of what is required for the
amplication eect to be large. In particular, as we can see from equation
(18), we need that the value of a match is highly sensitive to the productivity
shock, that is, we need
@EtSt+1(bt+1)
@zt to be large. This essentially requires large
asset price responses to productivity shocks. In this sense the model shares
the same features of the models proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where the amplication of productivity shocks
depends on the response of asset prices.
4 Simulation
In this section we present some quantitative results based on the numerical
simulation of the model. We will see that the model can generate interesting
dynamics of employment and nancial 
ows. However, the dynamics of wages
may appear in con
ict with the properties of wages observed in the data. In
the next section we will consider an extension of the model that generates
similar dynamics of employment and nancial 
ows but also more plausible
responses of wages.
4.1 Calibration
We think of a period to be a quarter and set the discount factor to  =
0:99. The matching function takes the typical Cobb-Douglas form m(v;u) =
vu1  where  is a constant. We set the matching parameter  = 0:7.
This is within the range of estimates found in the literature. For example,
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) report that the range of estimates based on
18aggregate data on total hires is 0:6   0:7. Using JOLTS data for 2000 and
2002, Hall (2003) estimates  = 0:765. We should also acknowledge, however,
that there are estimates with smaller numbers like in Shimer (2005). Dierent
values of  do not aect the qualitative response of employment although
it changes the magnitude. For the bargaining parameter  we follow the
common practise of setting it to 0.5 in absence of direct evidence.
After normalizing the steady state value of productivity to 1, we turn
our attention to the following ve parameters: the steady state value of
the enforcement variable  , the utility 
ow for unemployed workers a, the
separation rate , the cost to create a vacancy , and the constant in front
of the matching function . These ve parameters are calibrated using the
following conditions: (i) the steady state debt-to-output ratio is 0:1; (ii) the
utility 
ow for unemployed workers a is 75% the steady-state value of wages;
(iii) the steady state unemployment rate is 10 percent based on a broad
denition of unemployment; (iv) the probability of lling a vacancy is 0:7;
(v) the probability of an unemployed worker to nd a job is 0:93.
The choice of the target for the debt-to-output ratio requires some expla-
nation. Strictly speaking, this is much smaller than in the data. Typically,
if we look at business debt over the value added of the business sector, a rea-
sonable number is B=Y = 2 (when Y is measured quarterly). However, in
our model we do not have physical capital while in the real economy physical
capital is an important collateral for debt. Therefore, the debt we consider
in the model is only the debt that is guaranteed by (lifetime) prots in excess
of the opportunity cost of capital. Based on this observation, the stock of
debt in the model should be relatively small. This justies the 0.1 number.4
At this point we are only left with the parameters that characterize the
stochastic process for the two shocks, credit and productivity. Assuming
that the logarithm of t and zt follow independent rst order autoregressive
processes, we need to assign the persistence parameters,  and z, and the
standard deviations  and z. For the productivity shock we set z = 0:95
and z = 0:01, which are standard in the literature. For the parametrization
of the credit shock, instead, we use the empirical properties of debt. Since
the stock of debt is very persistent in the data, we set  = 0:95. Then we set
 = 0:3 so that the change in debt over GDP generated by the model with
4To see this more clearly, suppose that we add physical capital  K to the model, which
for simplicity is assumed to be xed. Suppose also that in case of liquidation the residual
value of physical capital is   K. Then the enforcement constraint would be bt+1    K +
EtJt+1(bt+1). Thus, what we call debt in our model is the term bt+1     K.
19both shocks is similar to the data. More specically we target the volatility
of (B0   B)=Y .
We would like to stress that the volatility of debt is crucial for evaluating
the performance of the model. We can generate any volatility of employment
by choosing the volatility of the credit shock. However, by imposing that the
volatility of debt generated by the model cannot be at odd with the data, we
remove this degree of freedom. The full set of parameter values are reported
in Table 1.
Table 1: List of parameters
Description Value
Discount factor for entrepreneurs,  0.990
Relative bargaining power,  0.500
Matching parameter,  0.700
Matching parameter,  0.762
Probability of separation,  0.103
Cost of posting vacancy,  0.298
Utility 
ow unemployed, a 0.714
Average productivity,  z 1.000
Productivity shock persistence, z 0.950
Productivity shock volatility, z 0.010
Enforcement parameter,   0.868
Credit shock persistence,  0.950
Credit shock volatility,  0.300
4.2 Responses to credit shocks
Figure 3 plots the responses of several variables to a negative credit shock:
change in debt over output, employment, output and wages. Since the model
is solved by linearizing around the steady state, the response to a positive
credit shock will have the same shape but with the opposite sign. The num-
bers are percent deviation from the steady state.
As can be seen from the gure, the response of employment is sizable and
quite persistent, re
ecting the persistence of the shock. The mechanism that
generates this dynamics should be clear by now. Since rms are forced to cut
their debt, workers are able to negotiate higher future wages starting from
20Figure 3: Impulse responses to a negative credit shock - Baseline model.
the next period. The response of wages is plotted in last panel of Figure 3. At
impact the wage falls below the steady state but then, starting from the next
period, it raises above the steady state. Since new rms start paying wages
in the next period, what matters for job creation is the response starting in
period 1, that is, one period after the shock. Thus, the anticipated cost of
labor for new matches increase in response to a negative credit shock and
this discourages job creation.
The initial drop in the wage of incumbent workers can be explained as
follow. All bargaining parties understand that, starting from the next period
wages are going to increase. Since the wage paid when the shock hits is
bargained before changing the debt, the total net surplus has not changed yet
(besides the changes induced by some general equilibrium feedbacks). This
means that the lifetime values received by both parties remain the same. But
then, if the value received by workers does not change at impact but there is
the anticipation of higher future wages, the current wage has to decline.
It is interesting to observe that the credit shock does not aect the value
21received by `incumbent' workers and rms (besides, again, the impact com-
ing from general equilibrium eects). So it may appear counterintuitive why
the rm chooses to borrow up to the limit if, eectively, this does not change
the surplus and the division of the surplus. This is due to the lack of com-
mitment from the rm. Since the new debt is chosen unilaterally by the
rm after bargaining the wage, the rm prefers higher debt to reduce future
wages. This is anticipated by workers who demand higher wages today to
compensate for the lower wages received in the future. If the rm could
credibly commit before bargaining the wage, it would agree not to raise the
debt. This mechanism has some similarities with the model studied by Barro
and Gordon (1983): since workers anticipate that the central bank in
ates
ex-post, they demand higher nominal wages today. Dierently from that
model, however, here there is not real costs from deviating, at least from the
point of view of an individual rm. As long as new rms can choose the debt
before bargaining with new workers, what happens once the rm becomes
incumbent is irrelevant for the dynamics of employment.
More on the dynamics of wages Although the model generates a sizable
dynamics of employment, the dynamics of wages may seem at odd with
the data. Typically, wages tend to be pro-cyclical. For new hired workers,
however, the model predicts the opposite. For incumbent workers the model
predicts a pro-cyclical response at impact but it changes sign immediately
after the shock hits. This also implies that the wages paid by incumbent
rms are very volatile, contrary to the data. These unappealing properties
of wages, however, will change in the extension of the model we will propose
in Section 5. With these extensions the model will be also able to generate
plausible dynamics of wages.
4.3 Responses to productivity shocks
Figure 4 plots the impulse responses to a negative productivity shock. We
also report the response when the debt limit is exogenously xed to the steady
state value. In this case we impose the borrowing constraint bt+1     J, where
  and  J are the steady state values of the nancial variable t and the rm's
value Jt(bt).
Productivity shocks are amplied somewhat when the borrowing limit
is endogenous. However, the magnitude of the amplication is small. The
main reason is because productivity shocks do not generate large changes
22Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative productivity shock - Baseline
model.
in the value of the rm. Thus, as can be seen from the rst panel, the
change in debt is not large. As observed in Section 3.2, large amplication
eects require sizable movements in EtSt+1(bt+1), that is, in asset prices. As
it is well known, standard business cycle models have diculties generating
large 
uctuations in asset prices and this is even harder when preferences are
linear.
In general, the response of the economy to productivity shocks is similar to
the standard matching model. This is not surprising since the version of the
model with exogenous borrowing is essentially the standard matching model.
Employment moves in the right direction but the size of the movement is
small. Thus, most of the movements in output are (counter-factually) driven
by productivity, not employment.
235 Model extension
As pointed out in the simulation of the baseline model with credit shocks, the
dynamic properties of wages may appear at odd with the empirical properties.
In particular, we have observed that the wages of new hired workers move
counter-cyclically in response to credit shocks and the model generates very
high volatility of wages. In this section we propose two extensions of the
model that are capable of improving the dynamics of wages. First we assume
that each rm is a monopolistic producer, that is, it produces a dierentiated
good used as an input in the production of nal goods. The assumption of
monopolistic competition is a very common assumption in macroeconomic
models. The second assumption is that, after the initial wage bargaining
when a new match is formed, wages are not renegotiated in every period.
As we will see, the new features will have very minor implications for the
dynamics of employment but will generate a more plausible dynamics of
wages.
5.1 Monopolistic competition
Before describing the whole technical details, it would be helpful to clarify
why monopolistic competition could change the response of wages to credit
shocks.
A well known feature of models with monopolistic competition is that
the demand for the dierentiated good and the prots of each producer are
increasing functions of aggregate production. In our model with equilibrium
unemployment, aggregate production depends on how many matched are
active which is also equal to the number of employed workers. Therefore,
higher is the employment rate and higher is the demand for each intermediate
good. Because of this, we will show below that the revenues of an individual
rm can be written in reduced form as
t = ~ ztN

t : (20)
The variable ~ zt is a monotone transformation of productivity zt and Nt is
aggregate employment taken as given by an individual rm. We call this term
net surplus 
ow instead of output for reasons that will become clear below.
Therefore, the introduction of monopolistic competition only requires the
replacement of rm level production zt with the net surplus 
ows t = ~ ztN
t .
24We can now easily describe how a credit shock aects wages. Thanks
to the dependence of the surplus 
ow (20) from aggregate employment, a
positive credit shock has two eects on the wages paid to newly hired workers.
On the one hand, taking as given aggregate employment, the higher leverage
allows rms to pay lower wages, which increases the incentive to hire more
workers. On the other hand, the increase in aggregate employment Nt, raises
the surplus 
ow t which, through the bargaining of the surplus, increases
wages. Therefore, whether a credit shock is associated with an increase or
decrease in the wages paid to new hires depends on the relative importance
of these two eects. As we will see, the second eect could dominate for
plausible calibrations.
5.1.1 Derivation of the surplus function (20).
Each rm, indexed by i, produces an intermediate good used in the produc-










Notice that the integral is over the interval [0;N] since there are N pro-






where Pi is the unit price for intermediate good i in terms of nal goods and
1=(1   ") is the elasticity of demand.
To make the monopolist structure relevant, we need to introduce some
margin along which the rm can change the quantity of intermediate goods
produced. One way to do this is to assume that there is also an intensive
margin in the use of labor. Suppose that the production function for good i
takes the form
yi = zli; (23)
where li is hours supplied by the worker at the disutility cost Al1+'=(1+').
An alternative interpretation is that li represents costly utilization of labor.
The monopoly revenue is Piyi, that is, the unit price multiplied by output.
Substituting the demand function (22) and the production function (23), the


















We can now impose the equilibrium condition li = L and individual
production becomes yi = zL. Aggregate production is equal to Y = zLN
1
"
and the unit price of intermediate goods is Pi = P = N
1 "
" . Finally, the
individual revenue is equal to zLN
1 "
" .
Using these results in the rst order condition for the intensive margin,







'" . Then substituting in (24) and
re-arranging, the revenue net of the disutility from working (net surplus 
ow)
















It is now easy to see the equivalence between this function and the net
surplus 













is a monotone function of z, and we dene  =
(1 ")(1+')
'" , the surplus 
ow
dened in (25) is exactly equal to (20).
5.1.2 Quantitative results
To calibrate the parameters that are also in the baseline model we use the
same targets described in Section 4.1. In particular, the parameter a is
calibrated to have a utility 
ow from unemployment equal to 75% the utility

ow from employment. In the baseline model this requires a value of a equal
to 75% the steady state wage. In the extended model, however, a is a smaller
percentage because part of the wage compensates the worker for the disutility
of working.
The new parameters are " and '. The rst determines the price mark-up
and the second the elasticity of labor supply. We set " = 0:8 which implies a
price mark-up of 1="   1 = 0:25. Then we choose the value of ' so that the
labor supply is equal to 1, that is, 1=' = 1.
Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to a credit shock. We rst notice that
the responses of debt and employment are not very dierent from the baseline
26model. The dynamics of wages, however, is very dierent. In particular, the
wage falls at impact and, contrary to the baseline model, it stays below the
steady state for several periods. Therefore, the extended model generates a
pro-cyclical dynamics of wages.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a negative credit shock - Extended model.
Although the sign of the response of wages is now more in line with
our prior, the model still generates large 
uctuations in wages. In the next
subsection we will consider a further extension that will correct for this.
5.2 Optimal labor contracts and infrequent negotiation
Although it is common in the searching and matching literature to assume
that wages are renegotiated every period, in general there is not a theoret-
ical or empirical justication for making this assumption. An alternative
approach is to characterize the optimal contract and possible ways of imple-
menting it.
Suppose that, when the worker is rst hired, the parties bargain an opti-
mal long-term contract. The optimal contract chooses the sequence of wages
27that paid to the worker at any point in time, contingent on all possible
contingencies directly related to the rm. The state-contingent sequence of
wages maximizes the total surplus which is shared according to the relative
bargaining weight . The sequence of wages must satisfy the participation
constraints for the rm and the worker at any point in time. What this means
is that, at any point in time, the value of the rm cannot be negative and the
value for the worker cannot be smaller than the value of being unemployed.
It turns out that the sequence of wages that characterizes the optimal
contract is not unique. The multiplicity has a simple intuition. Since pro-
duction does not depend on wages, the choice of a dierent sequence does
not aect the surplus of the match. For example, the rm could pay slightly
lower wages at the beginning a slightly higher wages in later periods. This
is also an optimal contract as long as the initial worker's value is the same
and the participation constraints are not violated. The second condition is
typically satised if  is not too close to 0 or 1 and there are only bounded
aggregate shocks. The assumption of risk neutral agents plays a central role.
With concave utility of at least one of the parties, like in Michelacci and
Quadrini (2009), the optimal sequence of wages would be unique.
Given the multiplicity, we have dierent ways of implementing the optimal
contract. One possibility is to choose a sequence of wages that is equal to
the sequence obtained when the wage is re-bargained with some probability
 . As long as this sequence does not violate the participation constraints,
it also implements the optimal contract. Another way of thinking is that,
when the rm and the worker meet, they decide not only the division of the
surplus (through bargaining) but also the frequency with which they renew
the contract. Since the parties are indierent on the frequency, we could
choose a frequency that seems more relevant empirically. Although from a
theoretical point of view the choice of a particular frequency is arbitrary, it
cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is suboptimal.
Appendix B derives the key equations under the assumption that wage
contracts are renegotiated by each rm with probability   and wages stay
constant until they are renegotiated. The net surplus generated by a match
St(bt) is still given by (10) while the net value of an employed worker when
the contract is renegotiated is
Wt(bt)   Ut = St(bt) =
wt   a
1   (1   )(1    )
+ 
t(bt); (26)
28with the function 
t(bt) dened recursively as

t(bt) = [(1   )    pt]EtSt+1(bt+1) + (1   )(1    )Et
t+1(bt+1): (27)
We can see from equation (26) that the worker's value has two compo-
nents. The rst component derives from contingencies in which the contract
is not renegotiated. The second component derives from contingencies in
which the contract is renegotiated.
5.2.1 Quantitative results
There is only one additional parameter to be calibrated. This is the param-
eter   which we set to 0:25. Given that quarterly calibration, this value
implies that wages are renegotiated, on average, every year.
Figure 6 plots the impulse responses to a credit shock generated by the
model with monopolistic competition and infrequent negotiation. The re-
sponses of debt and employment are not very dierent from the baseline
model. Wages, however, co-move with employment (thanks to monopolistic
competition already explored in the previous subsection) and their volatility
is signicantly smaller than employment (thanks to infrequent negotiation).
Therefore, the consideration of monopolistic competition and infrequent bar-
gaining allows the model to generate a dynamics of wages that is more in
line with their empirical properties.
6 Empirical analysis
The theoretical analysis suggests that shocks to the borrowing ability could
be important for employment 
uctuations. In this section we investigate the
importance of these shocks empirically using a structural VAR where the
identifying restrictions are derived from the theoretical model studied in the
previous sections.
We use a three dimensional VAR in the growth rates of TFP, Credit to
the Private Sector, Employment. The inclusion of the TFP series is moti-
vated by the need to separate the credit expansion induced by productivity
shocks from credit expansions driven by other shocks. As we have seen in
the theoretical model, productivity shocks have two eects on employment.
In addition to the direct impact, productivity shocks are amplied through
the expansion of credit that is made possible by the endogeneity of the bor-
rowing limit. The explicit inclusion of the TFP series should separate the
29Figure 6: Impulse responses to a negative credit shock - Extended model.
credit expansion induced by productivity shocks from the credit expansion
induced by other perturbations. We refer to other perturbations as `credit
shocks'.
The identication of the structural shocks is done through the imposition
of zero short-term restrictions. To illustrate the identication assumptions
it will be convenient to write down explicitly the VAR system as
(I   A1L   A2L
















where L is the lag operator and n is the number of lags included in the VAR.
The vector (zt;bt;et) is the observed data. It includes the growth rate of
TFP, the growth rate of private credit, and the growth rate of employment.
A more detailed description of the data is provided below.
The vector (z;t;b;t;e;t) contains the orthogonalized disturbances. In or-
der to assign a particular economic interpretation to these shocks, we impose
30that some of the elements of the matrix P are equal to zero. To be more









By imposing that some of the elements of P are zero, we are assuming that
some of the orthogonalized disturbances cannot have an immediate impact
on some of the variables included in the system. For example, if we set
peb = 0, the shock b;t does not have an immediate impact on employment et.
Since the identication of a three dimensional system requires at least three
restrictions, we have to impose that at least three elements of the matrix P
are zero. Thus, we start with the following restrictions:
1. Since TFP evolves exogenously in the model, credit shocks cannot aect
TFP. Therefore, we set pzb = 0.
2. Since an improvement in productivity aects employment with one
period lag (due to the matching frictions), innovations to productivity
cannot aect employment at impact. This requires pez = 0.
3. The same logic applies to credit shocks, that is, they also aect employ-
ment with one period lag. Therefore, innovations to the availability of
credit cannot aect employment at impact, which requires peb = 0.
With these restrictions we can interpret z;t as innovations to TFP, b;t as
innovations to the availability of credit, and e;t as residual disturbances.5
Data: The estimation uses quarterly data over the period 1984.1-2009.3.
The TFP growth is constructed using the utilization-adjusted TFP series con-
structed by John Fernald (2009). The growth in private credit is constructed
using data from the Flow of Funds. Specically, we use new borrowing (nan-
cial market instruments) for households and nonnancial businesses dividend
by the stock of debt (again, nancial market instruments). For employment
we have three series. The rst series includes all civilian employment from
5An alternative way to generate a just-identied system is to assume (i) pzb = 0, (ii)
pze = 0, and (iii) peb = 0. Results based on this alternative identication scheme are
similar and are available upon request.
31the BLS. The second series includes all employees in private industries, also
from the BLS. The third series includes all employees in the nonfarm sector,
from the Current Employment Statistics survey.
Impulse responses: We rst estimate the VAR system with et measured
by `employment in the private sector' and ve lags (n = 5). Results using
the other two denitions of employment (not reported) are similar.
The impulse response functions of Private Credit and Employment to
credit and TFP shocks are plotted in Figure 7. As far as the credit shock
is concerned, we see that this generates an expansion in the growth rate of
private credit that lasts for many quarters. Therefore, these shocks tend
to generate long credit cycles. Credit shocks generate an expansion in the
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Figure 7: Three variables (exactly identied) VAR: TFP, private credit, em-
ployment.
TFP shocks also generate an expansion in the growth rate of private credit
but the impact is much less persistent. The growth rate of employment goes
up but the overall impact is smaller than the impact of credit shocks.
32Overall, the results presented in Figure 7 are consistent with the proper-
ties of the theoretical model. In particular, we see that credit shocks have a
statistical signicant impact on employment and TFP shocks lead to a credit
expansion. As long as a credit expansion allows for more job creation, the
nancial mechanism allows for some amplication of productivity shocks.
In alternative to employment as a measure of the labor market perfor-
mance, we could use the unemployment rate. We re-estimate the VAR with
the growth rate of TFP, Private Credit and Unemployment. For unemploy-
ment we use the measure provided by the BLS. The impulse responses to
nancial and productivity shocks are plotted in Figure 8. Also in this case
we nd that productivity shocks have a statistically signicant impact on the
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Figure 8: Three variables (exactly identied) VAR: TFP, private credit, un-
employment.
Adding wages: Since wages plays a central role in the transmission of
credit shocks, we now expand the VAR model by including wages. Wages
are measured as Average Hourly Earnings for Total Private Industries from
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
33The VAR includes total factor productivity, zt, private credit, bt, employ-
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The identication is based on the following restrictions:
1. Since TFP evolves exogenously in the model, credit and other shocks
cannot aect TFP. Therefore, we set pzb = pze = pzw = 0.
2. Since an improvement in productivity aects employment with one
period lag (due to the matching frictions), innovations to productivity
and credit cannot aect employment at impact. This requires pez =
peb = 0.
3. Finally, the residual shocks to employment and wages are identied
using a non-structural triangular restriction, that is, pwe = 0.
As can be seen from Figure 9, the impulse responses for private credit
and employment are similar to the responses obtained with the three di-
mensional VAR. As far as wages are concerned, we observe that they rst
increase and then decrease. This is not inconsistent with the predictions of
the model in response to a credit shock if we focus on the wages paid by
incumbent rms. However, the responses are not statistically signicant at
5% condence interval.
Alternative identication: In the identication scheme adopted so far,
we have imposed that nancial shocks do not impact TFP, at least in the
current period. This is consistent with the exogenous nature of productivity
assumed in the theoretical model. However, we have not imposed in the VAR
that the residual shock e;t cannot have an immediate impact on TFP. There-
fore, we now repeat the estimation imposing this additional restriction, that
is, pze = 0. By doing so we have a total of four restrictions and the structural
VAR is over-identied. The impulse responses, plotted in Figure 10, conrm
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Figure 10: Three variables (over-identied) VAR: TFP, private credit and
employment.
35Discussion: The VAR results are consistent with the theoretical model.
However, they do not allow us to separate the transmission mechanism of
credit shocks emphasized in this paper from the typical credit channel. As
far as the most recent crisis is concerned, the fact that liquidity has re-
bounded immediately after the crisis suggests that our mechanism could be
more important for understanding the sluggish recovery. The standard credit
channel, however, could have been more important in the initial stage of the
crisis.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the importance of nancial 
ows for employ-
ment (and unemployment) 
uctuations. We have extended the basic match-
ing model by allowing rms to issue debt under limited enforcement of -
nancial contracts. Our approach goes beyond a mere cumulation of frictions,
respectively in nancial and labor markets. Firms have an incentive to bor-
row in order to aect wage bargaining as emphasized in the corporate nance
literature. Our paper embeds this mechanism in a general equilibrium envi-
ronment and investigates its role for the dynamics of aggregate employment.
In our model the ability to borrow can change exogenously in response to
credit shocks or endogenously in response to productivity shocks. Indepen-
dently of the sources of credit expansion, higher debt allows rms to bargain
lower wages. Through this mechanism, credit shocks can generate large and
persistent employment 
uctuations. The determination of wages based on
bargaining is central to these results.
The paper has also investigated the empirical relevance of credit shocks
using a structural VAR where the shocks are identied with zero short-term
restrictions derived from the theoretical model. The estimation of the VAR
shows that the impact of these shocks on employment is statistically signif-
icant. Although these ndings do not allow us to separate the transmission
mechanism based on wage bargaining from the typical credit channel, they
support the view that nancial markets are important for the performance
of the labor market.
36Appendix
A Wage equation
Consider the value of a lled vacancy dened in (14). Using the binding enforce-
ment constraint bt+1 = t(1   )EtSt+1(Bt+1) to eliminate bt+1, the value of a
lled vacancy becomes
Qt = (1 + t)(1   )EtSt+1(Bt+1):
Next we use the free entry condition Vt = qtQt    = 0. Eliminating Qt using
the above expression and solving for the expected value of the surplus we obtain
EtSt+1(Bt+1) =

qt(1 + t)(1   )
: (28)
Substituting into the denition of the surplus|equation (10)|and taking into
account that bt+1 = t(1   )EtSt+1(Bt+1), we get
St(Bt) = zt   a   bt +
[1      pt + t(1   )(1   )]
qt(1 + t)(1   )
: (29)
Now consider the net value for a worker,
Wt(Bt)   Ut = wt   a + (1      pt)EtSt+1(Bt+1)
Substituting Wt(Bt)   Ut = St(Bt) in the left-hand-side and eliminating
EtSt+1(Bt+1) in the right-hand-side using equation (28) we obtain
St(Bt) = wt   a +
(1      pt)
qt(1 + t)(1   )
(30)
Finally, combining (29) and (30) and solving for the wage we get
wt = (1   )a + (zt   bt) +
[pt + (1   )t]
qt(1 + t)
;
which is the expression reported in (16).
B Model with infrequent negotiation
Suppose that wages are negotiated (bargained) when a new match is formed and
then they are renegotiated in future periods with some probability  . In the
interim periods wages are kept constant.
To avoid some unnecessary complications, we make the following assumption:
37Assumption 1 The enforcement constraint takes the form tEtJt+1(bt+1)  bt+1,
where Jt+1(bt+1) is the next period equity value of the rm when the next period
wage is renegotiated with certainty.
This assumption insures that the borrowing limit is independent of the current
wage, which is dierent across rms depending on the renegotiation history. In
this way all rms continue to choose the same debt even if they pay dierent
wages. The assumption that the collateral value depends on the equity value of
the rm when the next period wage is renegotiated with certainty can be justied
with the assumption that, in case of default, wages are always renegotiated. Since
the lender gets a fraction of the rm's value, this assumption implies that the
collateral is a fraction t of the equity value of the rm when the next period wage
is renegotiated with certainty (since wages are renegotiated in case of default). See
Section 2 for the derivation of the enforcement constraint.
The value for a newly hired worker who bargains the rst wage at time t is









where Wt;t+1(bt+1) is the value at time t + 1 if there in not renegotiation and
the worker receives the wage negotiated at time t. Therefore, the rst subscript
denotes the last period in which the wage was negotiated and the second subscript
denotes the period in which the wage is paid.
The value of being unemployed is
Ut = a + Et

ptWt+1(Bt+1) + (1   pt)Ut+1

: (32)
Subtracting (32) to (31) and re-arranging we get


















Since in equilibrium bt+1 = Bt+1, we can rewrite the equation as
Wt(bt)   Ut = wt   a + 
h












38To simplify notations, dene
 = (1   )(1    )
t = 
h
(1   )    pt
i
^ Wt(bt) = Wt(bt)   Ut
^ W;t(bt) = W;t(bt)   Ut;
where   t is the time subscript for the last period in which the wage was
renegotiated. If  = t we have ^ W;t(bt) = ^ Wt(bt).
Using this notation, the net value of the worker can be written as
^ Wt(bt) = wt   a + tEt ^ Wt+1(bt+1) + Et
^ Wt;t+1(bt+1) (35)
The next period value without bargaining is
^ Wt;t+1(bt+1) = wt   a + t+1Et+1 ^ Wt+2(bt+2) + Et+1
^ Wt;t+2(bt+2)
(36)







where the function 
t(bt) is dened as

t(bt) = Ett ^ Wt+1(bt+1) + Ett+1 ^ Wt+2(bt+2) + 2Ett+2 ^ Wt+3(bt+3) + :::
The function 
t(bt) has a recursive structure and can be written recursively as

t(bt) = tEt ^ Wt+1(bt+1) + Et
t+1(bt+1): (38)







t(bt) = tEtSt+1(bt+1) + Et
t+1(bt+1): (40)
Finally, the surplus is the same as in the baseline model, that is,
St(bt) = zt   a   bt +
bt+1
R
+ (1      pt)EtSt+1(bt+1): (41)
39B.1 Evolution of aggregate wages
Denote by  wt 1 the average wage in period t 1. Then the average wage in period














where m(vt 1;ut 1) is the number of new matches.
To determine the average wage at time t, we need to know the average wage
in the previous period and the share of employment that bargains a new wage at
time t. This share is equal to
st =
 (1   )Nt 1 + m(vt 1;ut 1)
Nt
:
Using st, the average wage equation can be written as
 wt = (1   st)  wt 1 + stwt:
B.2 Summary







t(bt) = tEtSt+1(bt+1) + Et
t+1(bt+1) (44)
 wt = (1   st)  wt 1 + stwt (45)
st+1 =
 (1   )Nt + m(vt;ut)
Nt+1
(46)
Notice that equation (43) replaces the equation for the worker's value in the
baseline model with period-by-period bargaining. Equations (44)-(46) are addi-
tional. The set of state variables is expanded with the new states st and  wt 1.
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